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.41' Anan'yevs Tank--there has been remarkable continuity in ovyye arrnii v nastuplenii ,fTank armies in the in certain fundamental, aspects of Soviet mili-offensive), published in 1988,,is yet another4n atary science. One of ,those perceived con-l6ng series of Sovietworks dealingwith mobile tinuities has been Soviet dedication to, and group (operational. maneuver group) operafaith in, the utility of the offensive. Another tions.Z Today, one of the central; issues cohequally important continuity has been Soviet fronting the Soviets and, by .extension, the concern for operational .maneuver, or simply West, is the degree to which these continuities stated, the ability to conduct deep operations. remain valid. tional maneuver forces. 4 Soon. ho\kever, sucThe operational level of war, So defined, processful German application of these same techvided a vehicle for studying, preparing for and niques in Poland and Western Europe spurred conducting war under complex 20th century the Soviets (in 1940 and 1941) to attempt frenetically to reconstruct strong operational maneuver forces. The subsequent fate of Soviet
By the early 1930s, the Soviets had forces during the initial period of the Russoidentified the capability for conducting German (or as the Soviets call it, the Great
deep, sustained operational maneuver as
Patriotic) War clearly demonstrated the folly of the principalprerequisite for achieving suc, attempting to implement fundamental force cess at the operational level of ivar. They structure changes and a major rearmament proarticulatcd this capability in the tvin con-gram uring a period of impending crisis.
cepts of deep battle glubokiy boy) and During the first two years of war on the Eastdeep operations (glubokaya operatsiya),.
em Front, while the Red Army suffered grievous losses, the Soviet High Command painstakingly reconstructed its mobile forces and experimented with their combat use. By July conditions, which were created by improve-1943, a modem Red Army had emerged, ments in mobility, firepower and communicaformed around a nucleus of tank armies and tions. By tLe early 1930s, the Soviets had identank and mechanized corps, whose combat tified the capability for conducting deep, employment was guided by a sUphisticated and sustained operational maneuver as the prin-effeLtive system for the anal)sis and exploitacipal prerequisite for achieving Success at the tion of wartime combat experience. During the operational level of war. They articulated this last two years of war, these operational maneucapability in the twin concepts of deep battle ver forces spearheaded Soviet offensive efforts (glubokiy bo)) and deep operations (glubokaya and conditioned ever greater offensive succ.ess. operatsiya). Deep battle, a tactical concept, By war's end, the six tank annies and over 35 evolved to fruition by 1933, while deep operatank and mechanized corps, which operated as tions, an operational concept, received full defifront and army mobile groups, had written a nition in the 1936 Field Regulation (USTAX' . ' new chapter in the annals of mobile warfare. As a result of mobilizing and harnessing These mobile groups, the forerunners of modthe economic power of the nation through em operational maneuver groups, represented forced collectivization and industrialization, the essence of modem armored and mechaby 1936 the Soviets were able to field forces nized warfare. Their experiences have since procapable, at least ,n theory, of carrying out their vided guidance and inspiration for Soviet miliadvanced operational concepts for deep operatary theorists. tions. The Soviets tested these operational conFrom 1945 to the late 1950s, the Soviets taicepts by extensively employing armored, motor-lured their mobile forces to operate in Central mechanized and air assault forces in field exer-Europe in high-intensit modem war. During cises during the mid-1930s. the 1960s, the Soviets de-emphasized operaTlhe military purges of the Red Army (which tional theory because of their fixation on the began in 1937 and continued through 1941) inevitability of nuclear war. nyy manevr). 5 In essencc, the presence on Not coincidentally, Soviet views on the the battlefield of tactical nuclear weapons nature of contemporary combat evolved, and prompted renewed Soviet interest in operathe Soviets redefined the requirements for a tional and tactical maneuver. A dialectical proforce to achieve offensive success. One writer cess of change governed this evolution of miliarticulated the chief characteristics of future tary techniques and force structure, as multiple battle as: influences forced the Soviets to refine their 0 Transformation of traditional land actions concept of antinuclear maneuver and ininto land-air actions. creasingly to emphasize operational and tac-* Broadening of the role of mobility in all tical maneuver ( fig. 1) Shallower tactical echelonment and tactical echelonment to offset less-than-full Emergence of air assault echelon mobilization, to reap maximum surprise and to Emphasis on raid tactics establish high initial offensive momentum. Emergence of recce-strike concept Task organization at regiment 0 Preemptive destruction or neutralization and battalion (brigade) of enemy nuclear delivery, command and conEmphasis on radio-electronic combat, trol, and deep attack systems. surprise and deception * Early commitment of tactical and opera-
19M-Present
"Defensiveness' and "reasonable tional maneuver forces to achieve rapid penFestroyka sufficiency" in strategic realm etration, to enmesh forces quickly, to avoid PeWdyshka (breathing spacel in weapons development enemy nuclear response and to diminish the Increased emphasis on deep operations effectiveness of enemy high-precision fires. and rapid initial tactical and * Development and proliferation, to the operational maieuver Emergence of brigade a d corps lowest command level (battalion), of advanced structure cybernetic applications to speed planning and employing deception to achieve surprise, could ing political, economic, social and military realproduce success in contemporary and future ities. Solutions to the problems of contempowar. The military solution to the problem of rary and future war include: waging contemporary warfare seemed to rest in * Political: Arms limitations; force reducthe creation of a force structure that encomtions; and denuclearization of theater of passed, in its entirety, the attributes of operaoperations. tional and tactical maneuver forces; namely, a * Economic: Revitalization of the military corps, brigade and combined arms battalion economy (as % ell as civilian) by restructuring; structure. porarily, triumphed and are shaping the future structure has emerged in open Soviet stateSoviet force structure and concepts for conduct-ments over the past months, it is clear that ing operational and tactical maneuver, there is a sharp dichotomy between the offenImpelled by economic, political and perhaps sively oriented force so evident in Soviet writeven military considerations, during the past ings up to and through 1985 and the new and two years the Soviets have emphasized anew the apparently defensive force currently being proconcept of "defensiveness" in their military posed. In essence, the former force, whitch was doctrine and have argued that defensiveness offensive in its orientation, seemed to accord contradicts and alters what admittedly had with strictly military requirements, while the been a longstanding offensive orientation in new defensive structure appears to reflect the the component levels of military science-the dictates of economic and political reality. What strategic, operational and tactical levels. They is clear is that the ultimate form the Soviet force have underscored this declaration of defen-structure takes can have a profound impact on siveness with proposals to create a new military Soviet capabilities for conducting effective force structure, which, by its very nature, must operational and tactical maneuver, both in an be construed by the West as defensive. 7 offensive and in a defensive posture. tential future Soviet force structures and the rel-military standpoint clearly indicate a dichotative offensive and defensive potential of what-omy existing among Soviet military theorists reever structure finally materializes, poses certain garding the potential impact of high-precision fundamental questions that collectively form weaponry and changing geographical factors on the central issue confronting those in the West future warfare. who formulate arms control policies and verWhile some theorists argue tl'at the new preification regimes. Those issues relate to the con-cision guided munitions and more thoroughly ceptual basis of operational art and tactics and urbanized or reforested terrain are likely to to force structuring as well.
hinder implementation of traditional offensive The most critical issue at stake in the opera-concepts, others maintain that even greater tional and tactical arenas is to what extent long-reliance on deception, surprise and a combinastanding Soviet views on the value and feasi-tion of operational and tactical maneuver will bility of offensive action ha' e been altered by facilitate and justify continued emphasis on contemporary military, economic and political offensive action. however, the traditional offensive school preThis change will have major implications for vails, in light of current economic and political the utility of wartime operational maneuver, for realities, the So, kts will likely opt for a leaner the nature of Soviet restructuring and for the military establishm-.nt with greater stress on nature of the perceived threat. Assuming that rapid, selective prewar mobilization, prethe Soviets do not consider war to be immiemptive or rapid military operations and full nent, a political corollary for dealing with wartime mobilization and deployment, if future military uncertainty could be to display a required.
defensive posture and slow the pace of change Economic, social and political realities may in order to gain the requisite time and resources override those military imperatives that argue to undertake research and development and to for supremacy of the offensive to produce a genrestructure those forces necessary to deal with uinely defensive Soviet operational and tactical the uncertainty. force posture. If economic and political motives Whatever operational and tactical views the converge with and reinforce military arguments Soviets embrace will have to be considered
As late as 1985, buttressed by analysis of the impact ofneiv; high-precision weapons on combat, the Soviets still reiterated their frm belief that a combination of operational
and tactical maneuver, conducted by tailored forces operating in relatively shallow echelonment and employing deception to achieve surprise, could produce success.
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carefully within the context of their potential enemy's operational and tactical views. Specifically, they must be considered within the context of current NATO and US concepts of for-A Hind-D gunship ward defense, flexible response, follow-on force overlies T55s during attack AirLand Battle, and, even more impura training exercise. tant, within the context of whatever corcepts succeed them. Future analysis of Soviet operational art and tactics must pay particular attention to sur.h critical and volatile questions as surprise, mobilization, echelonment, maneuver, rapidly changing military technologies * (such as directed energy weapons, genetic engineering, microcircuitry, and recce-strike), missions and objectives, and command and control. 4 Equally important issues emerge in the area of force strucuring at the operational and tactical levels. By Soviet admission, the existing "heavy" force structure of the Soviet army has been best suited for conducting offensive operations. The future Soviet force structure will directly reflect the varied (social, economic, political) requirements of military doctrine, as well as satisfy the demands of operational art and tactics. As such, it will respond to economic and political, as well as military, imperatives.
Militarily, the final form of the restructured Soviet army will indicate Soviet attitudes regarding the nature of future combat, specifically the relative utility of an offensive or defensive posture. Soviet adoption of a lighter force structure, whose forward deployed elements lack components critical to the large-scale conduct of contemporary maneuver (armor, air assault and assault bridging) may indicate that the defensive school predominates. The adop-
The former force, which was offensive tion of a heavier force structure, in terms of in its orientation, seemed to accord with armor and mobility assets, may indicate the strictly military requirements, while the reverse,
new defensive structure appears to reflect A heavy force structure will probably incorthe dictates of econormic and political porate, partially or fully, corps, brigade and reality... The ultimate foum the Soviet combined ans battalions as shown in figures 2 force structure takes can have a profound and 3.a Tank battalion tacrical oirolrs, dependmn~tnn . nviet apabili .
ing on their parent unit, will perform the func- Figure 2 . Soviet "heavy" force structure (continued) tion of infantry support or conduct tactical other forces concentrate in key penetration maneuver in their own right; or conduct tac-sectors. tical and operational maneuver as part of a This heavier structure corresponds closely to larger unit or formation. Motorized rifle bat-evolving Soviet military judgments concerning talion tactical groups will perform a wide range the nature of combat from the mid-1960s to of offensive or defensive tasks depending on the 1985. A lighter force structure, evidenced by function of their parent unit and formation. recent Soviet defensive pronouncements, will The heavy weapons battalion will perform pri-likely contain significantly less armor strength marily a defensive function within fortification and fewer specialized forces suited to zonduct brigades, although it can also take part in offen-operational and tactical maneuver as shown in sive operations as an economy-of-force subunit, figures 4 and 5. by occupying large sectors of the front while This light structure reflects recent Soviet pronouncements concerning the reorganiza-battalion, but only fully integrate into that battion of tanks and motorized rifle formations, the talion during prewar mobilization. Similarly, creation of artillery-machinegun formations they could transform their division-regiment and the ceiling of tank strength in these forma-structure into a corps-brigade structure in a pretions. The rough ceilings were 160 tanks for a war period by shifting a minimal number of submotorized rifle division and 250-280 tanks for a units between organizations. In essence, detertank division. Precise TOE (table of organiza-mining whether this can be done will be one of tion and equipment) strengths are derived from the priority tasks of those verifying changes in these announced figures. 9 Soviet force structure.
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Battalion Tactical Groups
The Soviets could conceal their wartime The capabilities of whatever Soviet force ultistructure and a combined arms battalion con-mately emerges will depend on the composifiguration by retaining key elements of com-tions, task organization and mobilization potenbined arms battalions, such as the tank com-tial of forward deployed forces, as well as forces pany, undLa,.i,,ta control (in a singlC tank wilhin the Soviet Union. Of special concern to battalion). Companies of this battalion could the West should be Soviet capabilities for train and exercise with a specific motorized rifle rapidly reinforcing forward deployed forces that Finally, it is critical to understand that, in the Similarly, the Soviets should openly publish future, the strength and capabilities of the their regulations as do Western nations.
Soviet military must be measured not only by Regardless of which force structure emerges, the form of that structure, but also by the overall it will likely emphasize qualitative improvecorrelation of forces, comparative mobilization ments to compensate for reduced quantity of and deployment p,,ential and the political will forces and will stress creation of tailored forces, of the Soviets and their opponents to employ that can fulfill combat functions more flexibly.
their military forces. -Il NOTES
